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<Heading: Introduction> 
The paradigm of activation and self-responsibility to provide for basic needs has been on top of the political 
agenda in most Western social welfare states for years. This is true for Switzerland and means-tested ben-
efits are no exception to this development. Basic needs are guaranteed on the one hand by a constitutional 
right to minimum financial means and, on the other hand, through so-called measures of social assistance 
which include (further) financial support. Switzerland being a federal state, social assistance and the duties 
for the beneficiaries are regulated in statutes at cantonal level. There is no federal social assistance law. 
Neither the constitutional right to minimum financial means, nor the right to social assistance are 
unconditional. Both rights are subsidiary to the individual’s own resources and the obligation to work in the 
primary labour market. In addition, if the claimant is unemployed, they can be obliged to participate in a 
work programme offered by the social assistance authorities. Under certain circumstances, participation in 
such a work programme is not only a behavioural duty of the benefit recipient, which can lead to benefit 
cuts, but participation can also be an eligibility criterion for the benefits. The authors will focus on these 
programmes and mechanisms which can lead to questions over eligibility for minimum subsistence rights 
guaranteed by the constitutional right to financial support when one is in need (Article 12 of the Swiss 
Constitution; hereafter Cst. or the Constitution(1)). These programmes will be referred to under the term 
‘work programme’ or ‘remunerated work programme’. The first chapter of this book argued that the re-
publican argument for the resourcing of basic liberties by a system of social security can contradict another 
requirement of the republican theory of non-domination: an equal distribution of the freedom to change 
occupation and employment. In this chapter the authors will examine whether the implementation of these 
programs is in accordance with fundamental rights and more precisely, whether they respect the normative 
framework elaborated in Chapter 4 by Elise Dermine.  
To this end, the authors will offer a short introduction to the federal social assistance and work 
programme organisation in Switzerland. They will then move on to the right to assistance when in need 
(Article 12 Cst.) and investigate the scope of this right, its history, and its eligibility criteria. This allows them 
to show how this fundamental right to minimum subsistence is closely linked to human dignity and how it 
has been affected by the paradigm of activation and self-responsibility, leading to the construction of a duty 
to work as a precondition of the benefits. With this background, the authors will consequently explore 
whether this system respects the limitations to a duty to work set by international human rights law, or 
whether we can observe violations thereof, also affecting human dignity. Some general reflections on the 
protection of human rights in the activating welfare state will precede this evaluation.  
 
<Heading: Work-related duties in a federal social assistance system> 
This section will show that the Swiss Confederation’s federal structure – comprising 26 federal entities, the 
Cantons – greatly affects means-tested (social assistance) benefits and that the organisation of work pro-
grammes in the welfare system is highly decentralised. The Swiss system contains two layers of non-con-
tributory means-tested benefits: social assistance and ‘assistance when in need’. The former is dealt with 
at cantonal level. This is due to Article 3 of the Swiss Constitution, which guarantees the sovereignty of the 
Cantons, except to the extent that their sovereignty is limited by the Federal Constitution. Under Article 115 
of the Swiss Constitution(2), the Cantons are implicitly bound to establish a system for social assistance 
(Biaggini 2017: § 4 ad Article 115 BV). As a consequence, there are 26 different cantonal social assistance 
statutes which also regulate the behavioural duties of social assistance recipients including their duties to 
accept a position in a work programme. Welfare-to-work (WTW) programmes, including work programmes, 
are developed in some Cantons at cantonal level; other Cantons have delegated this task to the municipal-
ities. The only instrument aiming at coordination between the 26 Cantonal social assistance statutes are the 
(non-binding) guidelines of the Swiss Conference for Social Assistance (SKOS)(3). The SKOS guidelines also 
incorporate an activation policy framework. 
The second form of means-tested benefits – the ‘assistance when in need’, is based on Article 12 
Cst., which grants the means indispensable for a dignified human existence (to be discussed further in the 
next section). The provision of benefits is, however, a cantonal competence as well. Regulation of these 
benefits by the Cantons varies greatly (cf. Belser and Waldmann, 2010). The cantonal social assistance ben-
efits should provide the means for social integration and participation in social life. In contrast, the benefits 
according to Article 12 Cst. (‘assistance when in need’) are restricted to the minimum required in order to 
preserve a life in dignity. The benefits arising from Article  12 Cst. can in consequence be seen as the con-
stitutionally prescribed core of the benefits that the Cantons are bound to provide (Hänzi, 2011, p. 85; 
Schaller Schenk 2016, p. 258; Belser and Waldman, 2010). Article 12 Constitution becomes directly relevant 
only if the cantonal social assistance provisions fail to protect the dignity of welfare recipients (Hartmann, 
2005, p. 418). 
Both forms of benefits are only granted to persons who cannot support themselves and have ex-
hausted social insurance benefits, their personal means and other sources of support. Therefore, the system 
follows the principle of subsidiarity, meaning that this final state safety net is only available if other (per-
sonal) efforts and resources have failed or have been exhausted. In fact, the subsidiarity of benefits to per-
sonal efforts and the importance of gainful employment and personal responsibility are highlighted in the 
Federal Constitution several times.(4) This also influences the sphere of social assistance as Cantons are 
bound to respect the Federal Constitution in all their activities.(5) The principle of subsidiarity in the field of 
social assistance can therefore be seen as an implementation of the constitutional value of self-responsibil-
ity (Schaller Schenk, 2016, p. 184) and leads us to assume that WTW measures in general, and work pro-
grammes more particularly, – aiming at promoting personal responsibility and autonomy - are compatible 
with these values (Pärli, 2004, p. 49).  
All 26 Cantons provide work programmes for social assistance beneficiaries. The degree to which 
they are regulated in the legislation varies considerably. The aims are also formulated in various terms, 
ranging from social and professional integration to health preservation, providing a daily structure, and the 
general idea of reciprocity of benefits.(6) All Cantons allow sanctions in case of non-participation in a work 
programme. Strictly speaking – according to the SKOS-Guidelines – sanctions should only constitute a re-
duction of up to 30% of the contribution for basic needs (which amounts to a total of CHF 986/month(7) in 
a household of a single individual). Several Cantons, however, have adopted stricter sanction regimes in 
their legislation.(8) More importantly, certain violations of behavioural duties, especially of the duty to ac-
cept a job in a remunerated work programme, may lead to questions over eligibility for benefits, which also 
extends to eligibility for the constitutionally prescribed benefits according to Article 12 Cst (i.e. ‘assistance 
when in need’). This will be explained in more detail later and these programmes will be the focus of the 
remainder of this section. 
 
<Heading: Constitutional right to (financial) assistance when in need and the duty to work> 
 
<Subheading: 1. General> 
As mentioned earlier, social assistance and work-related duties in social assistance schemes are regulated 
at cantonal level and the only substantive federal rule on the benefit provision is found in Article 12 of the 
federal Constitution, which reads: ‘Persons in need and unable to provide for themselves have the right to 
assistance and care, and to the financial means required for a decent standard of living’.  
The interpretation of this provision – containing an individually justiciable social right – by the Courts 
and the Federal Supreme Court especially, has a potentially unifying effect on the whole system and can 
serve as a safeguard against excessive conditions and sanctions attached to the benefits. The following sec-
tions explore how the Federal Supreme Court has made use of the potential for unification concerning the 
obligation to work in a (remunerated) work programme. 
 
<Subheading: 1. Historical background> 
In 1995, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court responded to repeated requests from scholars and civil society 
organisations and recognised the right to a secure existence as an unwritten constitutional right.(9) The 
Court acknowledged that the protection of elementary human needs, such as nutrition, clothing, and shel-
ter are a prerequisite for dignified human existence and development. The right was also declared applica-
ble if a situation of need is self-inflicted. The Court, however, also mentioned that the deliberate refusal of 
an employment opportunity could lead to loss of benefits.(10)  
In 1999, the revised Swiss Constitution came into force and the right to a secure existence became 
a written constitutional right. To highlight that the right to a secure existence is subject to the principle of 
subsidiarity and that personal means override benefits, the Parliament changed the wording from ‘Persons 
in need have the right to assistance and care (…)’(11) to the current complete phrasing of Article 12 Cst. 
mentioned earlier (cross-reference to 1. General) (Waldmann, 2006, p. 353). With this emphasis on the 
inability to provide for oneself, it was made clear that benefits based on Article 12 Cst. are only available if, 
despite all reasonable personal efforts, someone is unable to obtain the means necessary for a decent ex-
istence and if those means are not available either from a third party or another source. Expressing the 
principle of subsidiarity in the constitutional provision was thus a way of qualifying the entitlement to ben-
efits.(12) 
 
<Subheading: 1. A right to what?> 
According to the Federal Supreme Court, Article 12 guarantees only what is indispensable for a decent hu-
man existence, in order to preserve the person from an unworthy existence requiring begging.(13) The ben-
efits, less extensive than the social assistance benefits (Hänzi, 2011, p. 171), are restricted to food, shelter, 
clothing, and basic medical aid. These basics are seen as a necessary precondition which allow an individual 
to exercise other fundamental rights.(14) This conception as a minimum guarantee also means that the 
benefits based on Article 12 Cst. do not have to provide means for participation in social life (e.g. travel 
expenses in order to visit friends and family). Benefits may be as low as CHF 21/day(15) which is, in view of 
the relatively high living costs (cf. note 7) and the fact that the Federal Supreme Court considers a minimum 
wage of CHF 19.45/hour (just) high enough to secure a decent living,(16) extremely low. 
 However, as the right to assistance when in need is a concretisation of the right to human dignity and 
therefore not to be generalised – it is impossible to provide a catalogue of benefits necessary to secure this 
right (Schefer 2001, p. 341; Hartmann 2005, p. 421). As Article 12 Cst. only guarantees limited benefits, the 
SKOS-guidelines do not consider the ‘assistance when in need’ as a suitable form of assistance for the per-
manent resident population in Switzerland.(17) 
Because of the close link between this fundamental right and human dignity, it is recognised that it 
cannot be restricted and leaves no possibility for sanctions. The scope of protection and the essence of the 
right are identical.(18) As long as someone is considered in need, they have the right to all these minimum 
benefits. In principle, it is not possible to cut the benefits arising from Article 12 Cst. if a welfare beneficiary 
violates behavioural duties.  
 
<Subheading: 1. …and under which circumstances?> 
However, recognition that the right to assistance when in need cannot be restricted does not mean that 
the benefits are granted unconditionally. In fact, the Federal Supreme Court interprets the phrase ‘not being 
able to provide for themselves’, incorporating the principle of subsidiarity, as an eligibility criterion for the 
benefits.  
Typically, someone who earns an income thanks to gainful employment covering their expenses is 
able to provide for themselves and cannot claim the benefits. The principle of subsidiarity as an eligibility 
criterion for the minimum benefits according to Article 12 of the Constitution goes, however, beyond the 
distinction of whether other sources – like gainful employment – are available to cover the needs of a per-
son. The Federal Supreme Court recognises that the principle of subsidiarity comprises certain duties – 
among which the duty to do everything which can be reasonably expected to end their situation of need. 
Part of this duty to exercise reasonable self-help is the duty to use one’s working power.(19) These duties, 
connected to the principle of subsidiarity, are seen as fundamental and their violation is liable to ‘eradicate’ 
eligibility for the benefits.(20) One aspect of self-help is to accept any reasonable work offer that would 
allow beneficiaries to provide for themselves. There is no generally accepted definition of reasonable work 
in the present context in Switzerland. The Federal Supreme Court stated clearly, in a series of judgements, 
that work programmes are per se reasonable work and that refusal to participate in such a programme is 
liable to ‘eradicate’ eligibility for the benefits.(21) Participating in work programmes is therefore one aspect 
which is treated as an eligibility criterion under the principle of subsidiarity.  
Scholars criticised the very first of these decisions(22). They claimed that a person who rejects rea-
sonable work should only be sanctioned (i.e. having cantonal social assistance benefits cut according to the 
SKOS-guidelines), but not deprived of the assistance according to article 12 Cst. (Amstutz, 2003, p. 97 f.). In 
fact, the argumentation of the Federal Supreme Court is intellectually challenging, if not contradictory: 
someone in need is a priori eligible for benefits arising from Article 12 Cst., even if this situation is self-
inflicted (Schefer, 2001, p. 348). The notion of need implies that other means of support were exhausted. 
The benefits cannot be restricted as the scope of protection and the essence of the right are identical. 
However, according to the Federal Supreme Court, the benefits can be combined with the condition to take 
up reasonable work in a remunerated work programme, and the refusal to do so leads to the loss of the 
eligibility for all benefits, as the beneficiaries would objectively be able to provide for themselves by per-
forming reasonable work.  
In other words: Article 12 of the Constitution is an “all or nothing” provision. But whether it is “all” 
or “nothing” depends on the behaviour of the welfare beneficiary. The consequences of misbehaviour are 
drastic: the benefits are cut to zero.(23) Two decisions from 2013 and 2016 clarified the conditions related 
to the refusal of benefits based on Article 12 Cst:  
- A programme position needs to be actually and concretely available and the welfare beneficiary needs to 
be, based on fact and law(24),capable of accepting the position. This gives them the necessary possibility to 
end the situation of need.(25)  
- A programme position needs to offer a remuneration, reaching at least the amount of the ‘assistance when 
in need’.(26) This allows for extremely low remunerations (for example CHF 21/day).(27) 
 
<Subheading: 1. Summary> 
In summary, it was first observed that Article 12 of the Swiss Constitution offers an individually justiciable 
right to the benefits indispensable for a life in dignity. Secondly, it was established that this right only covers 
the bare minimum needed to survive. This limited scope and the narrow connection to human dignity forbid 
that the right be restricted. However, thirdly, it was explained that the principle of subsidiarity is an eligibility 
criterion for the benefits. One eligibility criterion is the willingness to accept any remunerated work pro-
gramme position which offers remuneration adding up to at least the benefits granted under Article 12 Cst. 
Someone who is not willing to accept such a position will be left without any benefits for as long as such a 
position is actually and concretely available. Once a position is not available anymore, the benefits must be 
granted again.  
In the next section the authors will evaluate these programmes against the background of human 
rights law and thereby rely particularly on the normative framework developed by Dermine in Chapter 4. 
First, however, they will present some general thoughts on the protection of fundamental rights in the ac-
tivating welfare state  
 
<Heading: The impact of work programmes on (other) human rights and vice versa> 
<Subheading: 1. A complicated relationship between positive and negative state obligations> 
The activation reforms of the welfare state bringing about a substantial amendment of how benefits are 
delivered have taken place without significant participation from human rights bodies or a broader debate 
on the protection of human rights. The subtle – or, as shown earlier, not so subtle – pressure exercised on 
welfare recipients to accept work as a condition for help (De Schutter, 2015, p. 125) is indeed hard to assess 
under the traditional human rights protection doctrine.  
International law does not need to be transposed in national legislation for it to be binding in Swit-
zerland, which is following a monist system. If the Federal Constitution or other national law contradicts 
international law, the latter takes – besides some rare exceptions not relevant in the present context – 
precedence (Epiney, 2015, N 77 and 99 ad Article 5 BV). It has to be noted that Switzerland did not sign the 
ESC. However, as previously discussed, the right to assistance when in need, and the right to social assis-
tance more generally, is a necessary state benefit to secure human dignity and the exercise of other human 
rights. Granting the benefits can be seen as a positive state obligation under various provisions of interna-
tional human rights law which are also binding for Switzerland, such as article 11 ICESCR (cf. Leijten, 2018, 
p. 4; p. 195; Simpson, 2015, p. 86). The principal question is, therefore, how the obligation not to interfere 
with human rights and individual autonomy (negative state obligations) is respected in the social assistance 
system; a system which aims to fulfil human rights itself by putting people in a position where they can 
make use of their rights (positive state obligations).  
The Federal Supreme Court has, in order to assess certain situations of possible human rights in-
fringements in the social security system, developed the concept of de facto infringements of fundamental 
rights.(28) The specific case that developed this approach dealt with the disability insurance’s refusal to 
cover the extra cost for a vehicle that a partly disabled person requested for his commute to work after a 
change of residence.(29) The lower courts held that the decision to move was an infringement of the in-
sured person’s obligation to take reasonable steps to minimize the effects and loss related to his injuries 
(duty to mitigate damages), and that the resulting need for a vehicle was not the insurance’s obligation to 
remedy. The Federal Supreme Court, however, assessed the situation differently and reflected on the fun-
damental freedom of domicile. These reflections were decisive for the Court to re-evaluate the previous 
demarcation between the disability insurance’s duty to accord benefits, and the duty to mitigate damages. 
A human rights-based evaluation of the reasonable character of the duties to mitigate damages led to the 
conclusion that the denial of benefits constituted an unacceptable restriction on the freedom of domicile. 
The obligation to participate in a (remunerated) work programme is, however, assessed differently. The 
activating welfare state orders work measures as a condition for the continued enjoyment of benefits. 
This ‘ordered’ self-integration can be seen as a problematic aspect of negative state obligations – 
the state prescribes a certain behaviour, which leads to a loss of autonomy. Therefore, the case law(30) and 
certain scholars treat this situation of ordered self-integration as an immediate restriction of fundamental 
rights (cf. Hänzi, 2011, p. 72; Riemer-Kafka, 1999. p. 59), and they argue for the application of the generally 
known preconditions for limiting fundamental rights (public interest, legal basis, proportionality, no viola-
tion of the essence of the right). In practice, in our view this results in an incomplete human rights assess-
ment: the interference with the fundamental right (e.g. personal freedom) is only qualified as minor and 
therefore easily justifiable. In addition, the consequences on the positive state obligations are not evalu-
ated, even though the sanctions attached to the refusal to participate, inarguably, put the beneficiaries in 
a situation of indirect constraint: either accept the sanctions and thereby a violation of minimum subsist-
ence rights (positive obligations), or attend the programme and thereby accept a restriction of fundamental 
freedoms (negative obligations).  
This is especially well demonstrated by one case in which the applicant was arguing that the order 
to participate in a remunerated work programme was a violation of his right to personal freedom according 
to article 10 § 2 Cst.(31) The applicant was arguing that the ‘massive factual coercion’ to participate in a 
programme amounted to a violation of his right to personal freedom, as well as of his right to economic 
freedom.(32) The Court held that this argument was inadmissible, as the applicant himself had explained 
that he could obtain a job anytime, but that he preferred to rely on benefits until reaching the age of retire-
ment. Implicitly, this means that preferring not to work is not a position which is protected by this funda-
mental right. The applicant was ultimately deprived of all his benefits for the period of two months. The 
Court only focused on the negative state duties not to interfere with the personal freedom of the applicant 
and concluded that there was no (unjustifiable) infringement. What is missing is a holistic view of the situ-
ation: the denial of benefits itself for two months can lead to important implications on the right to human 
dignity, which is to be fulfilled by the provision of benefits (Article 12 Cst.) and thus through positive state 
obligations.  
It seems especially necessary to investigate which dimensions of a human right are affected, not 
only by an order to participate in a programme, but also by the ultimate denial of the minimum state ben-
efits. An analogous application of the concept of de facto infringements could allow for a holistic and human 
rights-based assessment of the limits of a welfare beneficiary’s self-responsibility when compared with the 
state’s obligations to protect, respect and fulfil human rights.  
 
<Subheading: 1. Aspects of freely chosen work and forced labour> 
 
<Subheading: 2. General> 
The prohibition of forced labour and the right to freely chosen work are important sources that could restrict 
the duty to take part in a work programme. The Swiss Constitution recognises a right to economic freedom, 
which includes the right to freely chosen work (art. 27 Cst.(33)). The Federal Supreme Court has so far never 
(thoroughly) assessed an alleged violation of the right to freely chosen work or the prohibition of forced 
labour based on the internationally binding sources.(34) However, evaluating mandatory participation in a 
work programme under the constitutionally granted right to freely chosen work, the Court did not see a 
possible infringement of this right, as the applicant had not been pursuing paid economic activity for several 
years.(35)  
Other cases also indicate the Court perceives the right to freely chosen work as temporary in nature 
and that its protection fades over time. After a ‘reasonable’ – unspecified – period of time, one is bound to 
accept any work, and the failure to do so exposes the welfare beneficiaries to sanctions.(36) 
In a recent case, the Court held that, if the offered occupation matched the definition of ‘suitable employ-
ment’ according to the unemployment insurance, there would be no violation of the prohibition of forced 
or compulsory labour. In principle, the obligation to participate in work programmes would not amount to 
forced or compulsory labour.(37) That the Court does – despite this bold statement – take surprisingly little 
interest in the working conditions in the work programmes, will be discussed in section the last section..  
These arguments do not consider all the dimensions of the prohibition of forced labour, which is 
another sign of the lack of awareness regarding possible human rights implications of WTW-duties and the 
duty to participate in a work programme especially. Therefore, the next sections will consider the case law 
of the Court against the human rights framework developed by Dermine in chapter 4.  
 
<Subheading: 2 Exit options> 
Dermine’s framework, based on the right to freely chosen work and the prohibition of forced labour, asks 
for an ‘exit option’ to be left open to welfare beneficiaries ordered to participate in an occupational pro-
gramme. This especially includes access to minimum subsistence rights while a sanction is imposed (see 
chapter 4).  
The current approach of the Federal Supreme Court does not guarantee such an exit option. Where 
the recipient refuses to participate in a (poorly) remunerated programme, this can lead to the denial of 
eligibility to the benefits and consequently to the loss of all benefits – no minimum subsistence rights are 
granted during this exclusion from eligibility for benefits. The only choice left to the welfare beneficiary is 
to either accept the position, or to be left without benefits. No hardship payments are available for this 
period (cf. Eleveld, 2018, p. 457). This punitive measure also undermines the right to social security itself 
(Sepúlveda and Nyst, 2012, p. 52) and has to be classified as a reinforcement of the legal duty to work and 
a reduction of the individual’s autonomy (cf. chapter 4). 
This loss of autonomy combined with the lack of satisfaction of essential needs during the exclusion 
from benefits must be qualified as a violation of the right to human dignity and might under certain circum-
stances amount to inhuman and degrading treatment, which is also incompatible with human dignity (cf. 
Simpson, 2015, p. 76 for a similar analysis regarding the UK). In fact, it is understood that human dignity – 
even if a right that is hard to define – consists of three elements that are relevant in the present context: a 
prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment; a protection of the individual’s autonomy and a right to 
the satisfaction of essential needs (Clapham, 2006, p. 546 s. McCrudden, 2008, p. 686). Inhuman and de-
grading treatment might also be caused by the inadequacy of state support (Simpson, 2015, p. 68). 
However, in the event that the recipient refuses an unremunerated programme they will continue 
to receive the assistance when in need, which can be seen as a (modest) exit option. It is important to note 
that in 2016 the court specified that it is possible to impose non-pecuniary sanctions on a beneficiary who 
is unwilling to accept an unremunerated programme. (38) As an example, the Court mentioned that the 
benefits could be provided in kind rather than in cash, or that the order to participate in a programme could 
be combined with a threat of criminal sanctions according to the criminal code.(39) According to the Court, 
such measures would not violate the scope of protection of the right to assistance when in need.(40) How-
ever, legal scholars disagree whether providing only in-kind benefits could lead to an undue restriction of 
other fundamental rights – mainly personal freedom and freedom of communication – and thereby lead to 
an inhuman existence, as no autonomy whatsoever is left to the person in need (cf. Amstutz, 2002, p. 
271).(41) Furthermore, in the opinion of the authors, the threat of criminal penalty constitutes an undue 
burden for the welfare beneficiary and thus amounts to forced labour (cf chapter 4). When combined with 
a criminal sanction, the refusal to participate in an unremunerated work programme can ultimately lead to 
imprisonment (cf. Meier and Studer, 2016, §62). The presumed exit-option for unremunerated work pro-
grammes is thereby invalidated. This neither respects the prohibition of forced labour nor provides for a 
system compatible with human dignity and again the autonomy of the beneficiary is undermined by these 
practices. 
 
<Subheading: 2.Time to look for a regular job> 
In order to respect the right to freely chosen work, the participant of a work programme should have 
enough time to apply and train for a position in the primary labour market (see chapter 4). Under a regular 
employment contract, the right to (unpaid) time off to look for a new job once notice has been given to 
terminate the contract is granted to the employees.(42) Given that work programme participants appear 
to be hard to place, it seems hardly justifiable that this time would not be granted in this context – unless 
there is a clear focus on training the participants and an exclusion from an obligation to apply for jobs in the 
primary labour market.  
The Federal Supreme Court has mentioned on several occasions that a work programme had to be 
accepted as it was not a full-time position and would leave enough time to the welfare beneficiary to look 
for a job in the primary labour market.(43) However, in the court cases where the beneficiaries faced the 
complete withdrawal of their benefits and complained about a violation of their personal freedom, the pro-
grammes were full-time positions.(44) Also, the Federal Supreme Court does not take much interest in 
knowing for how many weeks or months participation in a programme is ordered.(45) It holds that if a 
programme could provide an ‘income’ and could be started anytime, all benefits can be suspended for the 
length of the programme duration.(46)  
 
<Subheading: 2. Goals and effects of the programme> 
The ultimate objective of a work programme should be to ensure full, productive and freely chosen employ-
ment – which can only be achieved when the work programmes ensure meaningful work and improve em-
ployability (De Schutter, 2015, p. 146). Conditions that do not lead to eliminating the situation of need are 
not allowed in connection with Article 12 Cst.(47) This implies the assessment of the impact of the pro-
gramme. The case law in this regard is not rich. In 2004 the Federal Supreme Court held that it was ‘known’ 
that the programmes were beneficial to the welfare recipient, even though there were no scientific evalua-
tions available to support this point of view.(48) Since this decision, the positive effect of the programmes 
has never been discussed again in front of the Federal Supreme Court, which is surprising given studies have 
found the success of certain programmes inconclusive (Aeppli and Ragni, 2009, p. 8; Bonoli & Champion, 
2014, focussing especially on the federal structures of Switzerland). It has also to be noted that the decen-
tralised organisation of WTW-programmes in general can be an obstacle to thorough evaluations. One 
study’s (positive or negative) findings can hardly be transposed to another programme. 
Furthermore, it can be observed that the goal of the programmes discussed here(49) is not only the 
prospect of reintegration into gainful employment, but also other ‘beneficial effects’, such as helping to 
improve social skills, punctuality and teamwork.(50) One further aim of the programme discussed in the 
2013 decision was to assess whether the welfare beneficiary is actually motivated to work and is explicitly 
seen as an instrument with which to sanction the ‘uncooperative’ welfare beneficiary.(51) This tendency to 
use work programmes as a way to sanction instead of as an opportunity for reintegration can also be ob-
served when the Court proposes to sanction beneficiaries unwilling to participate in an unremunerated 
programme with criminal sanctions. This raises the question of whether helping the welfare beneficiary is 
really the goal pursued by this system, or whether it is just a way of disciplining the poor (cf. for an analysis 
of these mechanisms in the US see: Wacquant, 2009; Soss, Fording and Schram, 2011; cf. Vonk, 2014, p. 
195).(52) The latter has to be qualified as not only incompatible with the right to freely chosen work but 
also generally regarded as a WTW-regime that is incompatible with human dignity. To be compatible with 
the right to human dignity a WTW would have to enhance autonomy and connected values (i.e. self-deter-
mination and empowerment) (McCrudden, 2008, p. 701 referring to the decision of the Canadian Gosselin 
case). 
 
<Subheading: 2. Working conditions and quality of work> 
The quality of work in the programme is an important factor in deciding whether a programme could 
amount to forced labour or to an undue restriction of the right to freely chosen work (see chapter 4). Work 
made available by the state must at least be acceptable, which means decent and therefore respect the 
criteria stated under Article 7 ICESCR, including a fair wage and safe and healthy working conditions (Bueno, 
2017, p. 468). Furthermore, the state has under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR a positive obligation to protect the 
life and health of everyone(53) – and not just employees – which makes it, in our view, mandatory to at 
least apply the rules on protection against accidents and general health protection, including protection 
against excessive working hours, to work programme participants. 
The Federal Supreme Court partly acknowledges the importance of the working conditions in work 
programs for their assessment from a human rights perspective: in 2015, the Court stated that as long as 
the working conditions in a programme correspond to the definition of suitable employment in the unem-
ployment insurance,(54) a programme does not constitute forced labour,(55) and does therefore not con-
stitute a disproportionate measure.  
Despite this general awareness of the importance of working conditions, they have never been 
thoroughly assessed by the Federal Supreme Court in the present context. In particular, the question of 
whether the criteria stipulated in the unemployment insurance, such as respect for skills and usual condi-
tions of work, as well as those regarding remuneration, are met is never seriously checked (Studer and Pärli, 
2016, p. 1391). Quite on the contrary, the Federal Supreme Court also considers programmes as reasonable 
work when the remuneration is lower than the (social assistance) benefits received. In a decision from 
2003,(56) a possible remuneration of CHF 500 per month was sufficient in order to justify the complete 
withdrawal of benefits. According to the 2016 decision,(57) remuneration amounting to the benefits of the 
‘assistance when in need’ – which are, as mentioned earlier, limited to the bare minimum needed in order 
to survive – is sufficient. That this is nowhere close to a living wage required by Article 7 (a) (ii) ICESCR seems 
evident. It can also be reminded that the same Federal Supreme Court has found that a wage of CHF 19.45 
/ hour is (just) high enough to secure a decent living (mentioned earlier). Furthermore, the condition in the 
unemployment insurance legislation that the wages have to respect the norms in the concerned industry is 
not met by such low levels of remuneration.  
It seems that the remuneration offered in certain work programmes is at an excessively low level, 
and is thus tantamount to exploiting constraints by offering people who had no other options, employment 
on terms that would not normally be acceptable.(58) Therefore, we can observe that a general extension 
of the availability for work condition is attached to the programmes. Furthermore, the Federal Supreme 
Court neglects the potential effect that the working conditions in programmes could have for regular em-
ployment conditions. Neither was the claim heard that such programmes undercut existing wage standards 
in the general labour market,(59) nor does the Court assess the remuneration with a broader view that 
work programmes should also contribute to creating decent working conditions for everyone. So far, we do 
not know of a successful case in which someone subject to a remunerated or unremunerated work pro-
gramme was offered protection by labour law or employment law.(60)  
 
<Subheading: 2 Possibility for individual or collective voice> 
Additionally, capability for voice should be granted to the social assistance beneficiaries. This has an indi-
vidual and collective dimension: on the individual level a welfare beneficiary needs to be given the possibility 
to negotiate the terms of their participation in the work programme and it is demanded that valid reasons 
to refuse a work-position, such as personal factors are considered when someone is assigned to a work-
position (see chapter 4). Respecting choices of the individuals and thereby allowing them to spend time, 
energy and skills according to their preferences is a source of individual and societal benefit (Bueno, 2017, 
p. 469). On a collective level, the possibility of appealing against a decision should be granted, which implies 
the existence of effective procedural rights – the need for an effective appeal is especially pressing as the 
right to assistance when in need is associated with many undefined legal terms (unable to provide for them-
selves; reasonable self-help, etc.). This confers considerable discretionary power on street-level bureau-
crats. An effective system of judicial review is therefore necessary to make sure that this power is not used 
arbitrarily. We will address the issues of individual and collective voice one by one, though it will become 
apparent that they are linked.  
On the individual level, it is understandable that the Federal Supreme Court does not protect the 
personal preference to depend on benefits rather than to work,(61) even though the literature raises the 
question of whether alternative lifestyles would have to be respected by a welfare system with good reason 
(cf. De Schutter, 2015, p. 158). The Courts usually respect health reasons and (child-)care duties as a reason 
for rejecting a WTW measure.(62) Other components of the personal situation such as the capability to 
perform certain work activities are only assessed one-sidedly. If someone is not challenged by a work place-
ment or his qualifications are not met, a position must still be accepted; it can only be rejected if the work 
is (intellectually) overstraining.(63) On one occasion, a position has been held reasonable even where the 
welfare beneficiary was unaware which exact tasks he would be asked to carry out,(64) which shows the 
lack of interest in the capabilities and possibilities of the welfare beneficiary.(65) 
The individual dimension of voice also concerns individual access to justice which seems to be ob-
structed because of a procedural rule. While generally the principle of ‘iura novit curia’(66) applies, this 
principle is relativised when it comes to violations of fundamental rights: the claimant has to distinctly argue 
how far a fundamental right was violated by a decision.(67) Therefore, the Court does, in many cases, not 
respond to general arguments on violations of fundamental rights – even if a violation is obvious. This can 
lead to questions over the effective protection of fundamental rights against uncontrolled interferences (cf. 
Müller, 2018, 156 ss.). This means that in order to get the Court to hear a claim of violation of a fundamental 
right, the complaint must be explicitly argued in a way that requires specific legal expertise. Legal represen-
tation becomes a key factor for a successful complaint. Free legal advice and assistance including legal rep-
resentation is in principle available.(68) However, as has been shown by other scholars, legal representation 
is often denied and many procedural rules are not designed or applied to the advantage of social assistance 
recipients. As mentioned earlier, fundamental rights considerations are absent or only found in marginal 
notes in the judgements of the Federal Supreme Court. This may be for many reasons, but a likely one seems 
to be this procedural rule which applies when human rights are invoked. It is thus hard to describe the 
procedures as fair and equal (cf. Hobi, 2018; Wizent, 2014, p. 509; Heusser, 2009). 
Regarding collective voice (procedural requirements), the authors note that welfare recipients are 
not involved in the elaboration of occupational programmes. In addition, in many instances the decision of 
which programmes are developed for which target group is delegated from the political level to so-called 
‘strategic partners’ who are not subject to (the same) democratic control mechanisms and enjoy discretion-
ary power with less accountability. These procedural arrangements, combined with the lack of evaluation 
of WTW programmes discussed before may in our opinion result in insufficient control of discretionary 
powers.  
 
<Heading: Conclusion> 
Article 12 Constitution grants the means indispensable for a human existence and has close links to human 
dignity. The historical development of the right to assistance when in need shows that it has always been 
considered that gainful employment takes priority over the benefits arising out of Article 12 Cst. It was then 
emphasized that refusal to work in a remunerated work programme was a strong violation of the benefi-
ciary’s duties, which was so severe as to question whether the welfare beneficiary actually was in a situation 
of need. Remunerated work programmes have been defined as one instance of reasonable work in this 
sense, and the refusal to participate in these measures can therefore lead to suspension of all benefits. 
Through the mechanisms well-known from the ‘activation turn’ in the welfare state, a duty to work becomes 
a precondition for benefits granting (nothing but) human dignity and therefore the system constitutes a 
threat to human dignity itself. The construction of the principle of subsidiarity as an eligibility criterion to 
minimum benefits that led to this development strains the solidarity needed in order to unite a society and 
ensure a dignified life for everyone within that society (cf. Schefer, 2001, p. 339).  
This chapter’s analysis of the limitations of the duty to participate in work programmes found that 
an adequate theoretical framework to assess (possible) human rights violations by work programmes is 
lacking. This is also reflected by the case law of the Federal Supreme Court. A limited understanding of 
fundamental freedoms and social rights is demonstrated by the Court. The analysis of this situation through 
Dermine’s framework showed that human rights implications of work programmes are not assessed com-
prehensively. The Court takes little to no interest in the goals and effects of a programme. Certain points of 
the case law of the Federal Supreme Court are even more problematic than just the absence of considera-
tion: proposing criminal sanctions as an ‘exit option’ and low remunerations are both highly problematic 
under the right to freely chosen work and the prohibition of forced labour. 
This lack of respect by the Federal Supreme Court for the normative requirements of human rights 
might (at least in part) also be due to procedural rules that reduce the possibility for individual and collective 
voice and, as a result, make it more difficult for welfare beneficiaries to control discretionary decisions of 
the administration and street-level bureaucrats. As a result, welfare beneficiaries are at risk of being sub-
jected to arbitrary power in the meaning of the republican theory of non-domination (see Chapter 1).  
All in all, the current practice of the Court fails to ensure the prohibition of forced labour or guar-
antee respect of the right to freely chosen work and other (social) rights to the point that it attaches a duty 
to work to the enjoyment of human dignity. Perhaps surprisingly, this is the result of a restrictive interpre-
tation of a right, which was originally designed to protect the decent existence of everyone and the exercise 
of (other) fundamental rights: the right to assistance when in need according to Article 12 Constitution. In 
order to achieve a coherent system respecting human dignity, it is necessary to rebalance duties between 
the state and the individual, as required by human rights law. This also includes the related state duties to 
ensure the right to work and not to merely reduce it to an economic freedom to seek and engage in work 
(De Schutter, 2015, p. 152). Such a rebalance could contribute to realising decent work conditions for eve-
ryone – including those working in (remunerated) work programmes.  
 
<Heading: Notes> 
(1) Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999, SR 101. The Constitution is published 
in English, however, the English version has no legal force and is for information purposes only. 
(2) Article 115 Cst.: ‘Persons in need shall be supported by their canton of residence. The Confederation 
regulates exceptions and powers.’ 
(3) The SKOS-Guidelines can be consulted online, viewed 16 November 2018 from 
https://www.skos.ch/skos-richtlinien/ 
(4) Cf. especially: article 6 (‘All individuals shall take responsibility for themselves and shall, according to 
their abilities, contribute to achieving the tasks of the state and society.’) and article 41 Cst. (‘The Confed-
eration and the Cantons shall, as a complement to personal responsibility and private initiative, endeavour 
to ensure that:. {it follows a list of several social aims}). 
(5) Art. 49, 1 Cst. ‘Federal law takes precedence over any conflicting provision of cantonal law.’ 
(6) Survey among cantonal social assistance/welfare departments, unpublished, Basel; conducted in 2017 
by the research team of the project ‘Working under the conditions of social welfare’, cf. www.thirdlabour-
market.ch  
(7) Not including rent and health insurance. The Swiss Franc (CHF) is currently (January 2019) slightly weaker 
than the EUR (1 CHF = approx. 0.89 EUR). The living costs in Switzerland are, however, relatively high. The 
median wage in 2016 was CHF 6’502 and only 10% of the employees earned less than CHF 4’313, cf. Bun-
desamt für Statistik 2018, Medienmitteilung vom 14.05.2018, viewed 5 July 2018 from https://www.bfs.ad-
min.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/arbeit-erwerb/loehne-erwerbseinkommen-arbeitskosten.assetde-
tail.5226936.html. 
(8) This is at the canton’s discretion: unless the benefits are cut to a level not guaranteeing a dignified ex-
istence according to article 12 Cst., sanctions and sanctioning regimes can only be challenged on the 
grounds that they are disproportionate, which is a weaker claim than the violation of a (fundamental) right 
to benefits. 
(9) BGE (Bundesgerichtsentscheid – Decision of the Federal Supreme Court) 121 I 367. 
(10) BGE 121 I 367, C. 3.d. 
(11) Botschaft über eine neue Bundesverfassung vom 20. November 1996, BBl 1997 I 1 ff., 149.  
(12) BGE 130 I 71, C. 4.1.  
(13) BGE 130 I 71, C. 4.1; BGE 131 I 166, C. 3.1, 8.1; BGE 134 I 69; 138 V 310, E. 2.1.  
(14) BGE 121 I 367, C. 2 c.  
(15) Consisting of CHF 8 for food and hygiene and CHF 13 for shelter; BGE 131 I 166, C. 8.1.  
(16) Judgement 2C_774/2014 (21.07.2017), C. 5.6.6; There is no federally binding minimum wage in Swit-
zerland.  
(17) SKOS-Guidelines, A.9. In fact, the regime of art. 12 Cst. is mainly applied to and developed in relation 
to asylum seekers subject to a legally binding removal decision for which a departure deadline has been 
fixed. This group is excluded from more comprehensive benefit systems, namely the social assistance ben-
efits (cf. Art. 82 Asylum Act of the 26 of June 1998, SR 142.31). The difference in treatment based on the 
resident status is justified, according to the Federal Supreme Court, because for persons without a perma-
nent resident status, the integration into society and/or the labour market is not wanted, and therefore 
lower benefits are required (cf. BGE 131 I 166; for further reading cf, Belser and Waldmann, 2010). 
 
(18) BGE 130 I 71, C. 4.1.  
(19) Judgement 8C_156/2007 (11.03.2008) C. 6.4.  
(20) Judgement 2P.147/2002 (04.03.2003) C. 3.4.  
(21) Judgement 2P.147/2002 (04.03.2003); BGE 130 I 71; Judgement 8C_156/2007 (11.03.2008); BGE 139 
I 218; Judgement 8C_536/2015 (22.12.2015); BGE 142 I 1. 
(22) Judgement 2P.147/2002 (04.03.2003).  
(23) Judgement 2P.147/2002 (04.03.2003); BGE 130 I 71; BGE 139 I 218. 
(24) Someone without a work permit – like asylum seekers who are bound to leave the country – cannot be 
subject to this form of conditionality, cf. BGE 122 II 193, C. 2c.  
(25) BGE 139 I 218.  
(26) BGE 142 I 1, C. 7.2.6.  
(27) Cf. BGE 131 I 166, C. 8. As mentioned earlier, assistance when in need is regulated by the Cantons and 
the benefits differ. 
(28) cf. a series of cases starting with BGE 113 V 22 (1987; costs for a disability adapted car in order to 
exercise the freedom of domicile - granted); BGE 118 V 206 (1992; costs for visiting and nursing a sick new 
born - granted); BGE 134 I 105 (2007; costs for the renovation of a flat in order to adapt it to the needs of a 
paraplegic child in order to exercise child care rights - granted); BGE 135 I 116 (2008; right to an electric 
pulling device for a wheelchair in order to enjoy family live – denied). 
(29) BGE 113 V 22. 
(30) In all the cases discussed here, the Court applied without any further discussion the general precondi-
tions for the limitation of fundamental rights. In none of the cases that are discussed here, the Court seemed 
to doubt that – if anything – the general preconditions for the limitation of fundamental rights will be ap-
plied.  
(31) article 10 § 2 Cst: ‘Every person has the right to personal liberty and in particular to physical and mental 
integrity and to freedom of movement.’ The right to personal freedom only protects the most fundamental 
aspects of personal development and private life, and not every single restriction of a personal lifestyle has 
an impact on one’s fundamental rights. The right to personal freedom is in comparison to the right to freely 
chosen work and the prohibition of forced labour (discussed later) a more general protection for the indi-
vidual’s autonomy. Therefore, it is only relevant when there is not a more specific fundamental right in-
fringed (for further reading: Tschentscher, 2015). 
(32) Judgement 2P.147/2002 (04.03.2003), C. 3.5.2. 
(33) Art. 27: 1 Economic freedom is guaranteed. 2 Economic freedom includes in particular the freedom to 
choose an occupation as well as the freedom to pursue a private economic activity. 
(34) As mentioned, the ESC is not binding for Switzerland, but the right to freely chosen work and the pro-
hibition of forced labour are contained in the ICESCR, ILO Convention No. 29 and the ECHR, which Switzer-
land did ratify. Furthermore, the Federal Constitution expressly protects the right to freely chosen work and 
the prohibition of forced labour is seen as the core content of this right. 
(35) Judgement 2P.7/2003 (14.01.2003), C. 2.3.  
(36) Judgement 2P.275/2003 (06.11.2003), E. 5.2.  
(37) Judgement 8C_536/2015 (22.12.2015), C. 2.2.  
(38) BGE 142 I 1, C. 7.2.5.  
(39) Cf. article. 292 Swiss Criminal Code. 
(40) BGE 142 I 1, C. 7.2.5. 
(41) see also the doctrine cited in BGE 135 I 119, C. 7.2, which however left the question undecided. 
(42) article 329 para. 3 Federal Act on the Amendment of the Swiss Civil Code of 30 March 1911, SR 220.  
(43) BGE 130 I 71, C. 5.4.; Judgement 8C_156/2007, C. 6.5.  
(44) BGE 139 I 218; Judgement 2P.147/2002 (04.03.2003).  
(45) Cantonal policies might contain such information.  
(46) BGE 139 I 218. Theoretically it would be possible to hold open a programme position for much longer 
than two months, which would justify an exclusion from benefits for a longer period of time. So far, the 
authors are not aware of cases in which the exclusion from benefits has been applied for more than three 
months. 
(47) BGE 131 I 166, C. 4.4. 
(48) BGE 130 I 71, C. 5.4.  
(49) There are Cantons who have evaluations of the programmes and distinguish programmes according to 
the aim they pursue. Cf. for example: Canton de Vaud (2014). Cour des comptes du Canton de Vaud. Audit 
de la performance des mesures cantonales d’insertion professionnelle destinées aux bénéficiaires de l’aide 
sociale. Lausanne: Canton de Vaud. 
(50) BGE 139 I 218, C. 4.4. 
(51) This was stated in the decision of the Cantonal administrative Court, cf. Verwaltungsgericht des Kantons 
Bern, Bernische Verwaltungsrechtspflege (BVR) 2013, p. 463 ss. C. 2.2.  
(52) cf. BGE 142 I 1, C. 7.2.5, where the Court refers to ‘unruly’ (renitent) welfare beneficiaries, requiring 
additional sanctions.  
(53) ECtHR, 24.07.2014, Appl. No. 60908/11, 62110/11, 62129/11,62312/11, 62338/11, Brincat and others 
v. Malta. 
(54) The criteria in article 16, 2 of the Bundesgesetz über die obligatorische Arbeitslosenversicherung und 
die Insolvenzentschädigung, SR 837.0 correspond basically to the criteria set out by ILO Convention 168, 
which is binding for Switzerland. Further specifications are found in ILO Recommendation 176.  
(55) Judgement 8C_536/2015 (22.12.2015), C. 2.2.  
(56) BGE 130 I 71.  
(57) BGE 142 I 1.  
(58) cf. Dermine in chapter 4, with reference to CEACR General report, par. 106. 
(59) Judgement 2P.7/2003 (14.01.2003), C. 2.3.  
(60) Certain Cantons do use control mechanisms, like tripartite commissions, protecting against abusive 
working conditions. 
(61) Judgement 2P.147/2002 (04.03.2003). 
(62) BGE 142 I 1, C. 6; Judgement 8C_536/2015 (22.12.2015), C 2.1; BGE 139 I 218, C. 4.4. 
(63) Judgement 8C_156/2007 (11.04.2008), C. 6.4. 
(64) BGE 130 I 71, C. 3.  
(65) Special attention would have to be paid to additional requirements set by specific international human 
rights treaties such as the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities stating that individual needs 
and strengths have to be the basis for rehabilitation programmes (Article 26 CRPD).  
(66) Meaning “the Court knows the law“ and that the Court has to apply the law to the facts.  
(67) Cf. Art. 106, 2 Bundesgesetz vom 17.05.2005 über das Bundesgericht, SR 173.110.  
(68) article 29 para. 3 Cst. 
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